Special Issue of *Philosophical Exploration* on “Basic Desert”

Call for Papers

Special Issue of *Philosophical Exploration* on “Basic Desert”

Guest Editors: Derk Pereboom and Maureen Sie

Submission Deadline: Oct 1st, 2012 (please let us know that you aim to submit, before March 2012)

Invited Contributors: Michael McKenna, Dana Nelkin, Adina Roskies, and Thomas Scanlon

Background and Aim:
In 1962, P. F. Strawson concluded his hallmark essay “Freedom and Resentment” with the remark that a sufficiently modified version of the optimist’s view on moral responsibility is the right one. With this he had in mind that our everyday practice of holding each other morally responsibility retains its raison d’être even if free will as libertarians construe it turns out to be illusory. By his lights, optimists justify this practice solely by its beneficial consequences, while pessimists correctly reject this strategy. A key claim of Strawson’s is that the pessimist’s reaction discloses how deeply rooted our natural reactive attitudes are, and his famous contention is that the metaphysical debate on the issue of free will and moral responsibility should take these attitudes as its point of departure. The quest for a justification for holding each other moral responsibility can only be understood from within the practice itself, and it is the reactive attitudes that lie at the core of this practice.

The half a century since the appearance of Strawson’s paper has witnessed significant developments of multiple perspectives on free will and moral responsibility. Many compatibilists have been strongly influenced by Strawson’s view, and some have linked it to accounts of responsibility in which our ability to act in response to reasons, or else the notion of a real self, has the crucial role. Libertarians have set out new and more sophisticated versions of the non-causal, event-causal, and agent-causal perspectives, and in many such accounts, Strawson’s notion of what moral responsibility is has had a major influence. But at the same time, philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists have attempted to cast doubt on whether a notion of moral responsibility as strong as Strawson’s legitimately applies to us, and some have claimed that we should abandon or radically change our everyday practices of holding each other morally responsible.

A focal point of the current discussion is the claim that the reactive attitudes presuppose a robust notion of desert. When one agent is indignant with another, the attitude in some sense presupposes that the agent to whom it is directed deserves, in a robust sense, that indignation. It remains open whether the desert that is presupposed can be given a contractualist or consequentialist account, or whether it is basic in the sense that the agent deserves the indignation just because she has knowingly committed an immoral action. This special issue of Philosophical Explorations seeks contributions that shed light on the notion of desert implicated in our practice of holding each other morally responsible, and on whether and how such a notion might be retained in the face of the challenges that have sought to dislodge it.

Submission Details
Please send a pdf-version of your paper (max. 8000 words) to Maureen Sie .
Contributions that do not make it to the special issue may be considered for publication in one of
the regular issues of *Philosophical Explorations*.

Further Inquiries
Please direct any inquiries about this call for papers to sie , mention ‘Basic Desert’ as subject

Derk Pereboom
Sage School of Philosophy
218 Goldwin Smith Hall
Cornell University
Ithaca NY, 14853 USA

Personal website:

http://www.arts.cornell.edu/phil/homepages/pereboom/

Maureen Sie
Department of Philosophy
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Po box 1738
3000DR, Rotterdam
The Netherlands

Personal website:

http://www.maureensie.info

Announcement Workshop Narrativity: Interpretation, Embodiment and Responsibility

3rd Workshop in the series Moral Agency, Deliberative Awareness, and Conscious Control

19, 20 and 21 October, 2012 (conference location: International School for Philosophy, Amersfoort, The Netherlands).

Organized by Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands & Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany.

Preliminary program:


Friday 19 October (start around 12.00 with registration and lunch)

Irene Bucelli (Kings College, London)

The Author and the Narrator. Narrativity as a Condition for Agency

Steven Delay (Rice University)

The Toiling Lily: Narrative Life, Responsibility, and the Ontological Ground of Self-Deception

Fleur Jongepier (Radboud University Nijmegen)

Two Conceptions of Narrative Identity

Lynne Rudder Baker (University of Massachusetts Amherst)

Making Sense of Ourselves: Self-Narratives and Personal Identity

Comments: Leon de Bruin (University of Bochum)


Saturday 20 October

Marion Smiley (Brandeis University)

Excuse-Giving, Self-Narration, and the Social Construction of Responsibility

Comments: Humberto Brito (New University of Lisbon)

Nicole van Voorst Vader-Bours (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

Narrative Responsibility Assessment for Non-Deliberated Acts

Natallia Stelmak Schabner (The Graduate Center, City University of New York)

Narrativity and Action

Martin Weichold (University of Göttingen)

Narrative Responsibility for Unreflective Action

Frank Hindriks (University of Groningen)

Moral Narratives for Better or Worse

Comments: Patrick Delaere (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

Agustín Vicente (University of the Basque Country)

Agency, Attribution and Responsibility

Comments: Wim de Mijnck (Radboud University Nijmegen)


Sunday 21 October (end around 13.00 with lunch)

Anika Fiebich (Ruhr-University Bochum)

The Role of Interaction and Narratives for Social Understanding

Zuzanna Rucinska (University of Hertfordshire)

Pretence as Embodiment of Social Narratives Instead of Individual Concepts

Filippo Santoni de Sio, Nicole Vincent & Bjørn Jespersen (Delft University of Technology)

Persons, Roles, and Excuse: Why the BCN Cannot Tell Us Who We Are

Comments: Bert Musschenga (VU University Amsterdam)

The latest update of this program is posted on: <https://maureensie.wordpress.com>

Registration open till September 17. Please send an email to: Workshop Mail <mailto:workshopMA10@fwb.eur.nl> subject-heading ‘registration narrativity’

Conference fee:

– 250 euro (includes three lunches, coffee and tea)

– 520 euro (two nights in a single room, two breakfasts, three lunches and two conference dinners, coffee and tea)

– Reduction of 40% for unwaged (PhD) students under the age of 30.

If you’re interested in participation, but have no possibilities for funding, please contact sie@fwb.eur.nl.

All researchers working in the area are welcome, but there are only a limited number of places available. Closing date: September 17.

Registration for one day is possible, but only if places are still available after the closing date.

Organizing Committee: Maureen Sie, Nicole van Voorst Vader, Arno Wouters and Leon de Bruin (reseach group Maureen Sie, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands, in collaboration with the research group of Albert Newen, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany)

 

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Call for papers: Narrativity: Interpretation, Embodiment and Responsibility

Call for Papers:

Narrativity: Interpretation, Embodiment and Responsibility

3rd Workshop in the series Moral Agency, Deliberative Awareness, and Conscious Control

& Special Issue of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Erasmus University of Rotterdam, the Netherlands

& Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany.

Special slots reserved for PhD’s and junior researchers!

Friday – Sunday 19-21 October 2012

Location: International School for Philosophy, Leusden, The Netherlands (within easy reach of airport Schiphol, Amsterdam)

The reasons we provide to understand, explain, and justify ourselves can be seen as attempts to interpret our behavior in broader narratives (our own, that of the audience and/or the narratives figuring in our society). These narratives create coherence in our behavior, and greatly enhance our capacity for interpersonal understanding. However, findings in the behavioral, cognitive and neurosciences raise questions about the extent to which the reasons we give and the overarching narratives they are part of correspond with the actual influences on and causes of our behavior. These findings seem to indicate that our attempts to account for the origins of our actions should primarily be seen as rational reconstructions.

This raises issues about the relation of narratives to our identity and actions. How do our attempts to fit our behavior into acceptable narratives influence who we are and what we do? What can we learn from the behavioral, cognitive and neurosciences about the embodiment and function of narratives? Can narratives obstruct a clear view on ourselves? If so, can we identify criteria to assess the adequacy or correctness of narratives and our attempts to fit our behavior into a narrative?

This workshop invites papers that explore the relevance of narratives and reasons as intermediates between ourselves and society, with an eye on (i) the implications for philosophical accounts of our practices of responsibility, and (ii) the empirical findings with regard to the role of narrativity and interpretation in our everyday interactions.

Suitable topics include:

·      The relevance of narratives to understanding human action and responsibility

·      Self-narrative, social interaction (including inter-group interaction) and embodiment

·      Conditions of adequacy for narratives (especially self-narratives) in relation to our practices of responsibility

·      The relation between self-understanding and action

·      Conditions of adequacy of interpretation (e.g., how can we distinguish between an adequate reconstruction of one’s reasons and confabulation?)

·      How to understand the empirical findings with regard to the role of narrativity and interpretation in our everyday interactions.

There will be 4 slots of 40 minutes for junior researchers (20 minutes talk, 20 minutes discussion), and 7 or 8 slots for the other invited participants (45 minutes talks and 45 minutes discussion).

A selection of the papers presented on the workshop will be eligible for publication in a special issue of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (http://www.springer.com/philosophy/philosophical+traditions/journal/11097).

Please indicate whether you want your paper considered for publication in this issue.

More information: https://maureensie.wordpress.com/workshops/workshop-iii/

If you’re interested, please send us an extended abstract (about 1,500 words) of your intended paper and a short (!) bio (related to your research) or list of publications, before May 2012. Notification of acceptance will be based on the abstracts and can be expected in June. The paper itself is expected three weeks before the start of the workshop, that is, before October 1st. Preferably your paper should not yet be submitted for publication at the time of the workshop.

Deadlines

Closing date: May 1st 2012

Notification of acceptance: June 2012

Deadline Draft Papers: End of September 2012

Send your PDF’s or plain text to: workshopMA10@fwb.eur.nl (subject heading: narrativity-submission or narrativity-inquiry)

Practical information

The workshop will start with a lunch on Friday (around 12.00), and end after the lunch on Sunday (around 14.00).

Invited speakers will be expected to pay 220 euro for accommodation and meals (includes: two breakfasts, three lunches, two conference dinners, and two nights in a single room). All-inclusive participation to the workshop for non-speakers will be 520 euro; participation without dinner and accommodation, but including lunch: 250 euro. Reduction of 40% (150 euro) available for unwaged (PhD) students under the age of 30.

Like our 2011 workshop, this workshop will be held at conference centre ‘International School for Philosophy’ (Leusden/Amersfoort), which is beautifully located in the woods nearby Utrecht & Amsterdam, the Netherlands (http://www.isvw.nl/nl/english/). It is easy to reach by public transportation.

Organizing committee

Maureen Sie, Nicole van Voorst Vader, Arno Wouters (Erasmus University Rotterdam) and Leon de Bruin (in collaboration with the research group of Albert Newen, Ruhr-Universität Bochum)

Call for papers: “Basic Desert”, special issue of Philosophical Explorations

Invited Contributors: Michael McKenna, Dana Nelkin, Adina Roskies, and Thomas Scanlon

Guest Editors: Derk Pereboom and Maureen Sie

Submission Deadline:  Oct 1st, 2012 (please let us know that you aim to submit, before March 2012)

Submission Details

Please send a pdf-version of your paper (max. 8000 words) to Maureen Sie.

Contributions that do not make it to the special issue may be considered for publication in one of the regular issues of *Philosophical Explorations*.

Please direct any inquiries about this call for papers to Maureen Sie, mention ”Basic Desert” as subject.

Background and Aim

In 1962, P. F. Strawson concluded his hallmark essay “Freedom and Resentment” with the remark that a sufficiently modified version of the optimist’s view on moral responsibility is the right one. With this he had in mind that our everyday practice of holding each other morally responsibility retains its raison d’être even if free will as libertarians construe it turns out to be illusory. By his lights, optimists justify this practice solely by its beneficial consequences, while pessimists correctly reject this strategy. A key claim of Strawson’s is that the pessimist’s reaction discloses how deeply rooted our natural reactive attitudes are, and his famous contention is that the metaphysical debate on the issue of free will and moral responsibility should take these attitudes as its point of departure. The quest for a justification for holding each other moral responsibility can only be understood from within the practice itself, and it is the reactive attitudes that lie at the core of this practice.

The half a century since the appearance of Strawson’s paper has witnessed significant developments of multiple perspectives on free will and moral responsibility. Many compatibilists have been strongly influenced by Strawson’s view, and some have linked it to accounts of responsibility in which our ability to act in response to reasons, or else the notion of a real self, has the crucial role. Libertarians have set out new and more sophisticated versions of the non-causal, event-causal, and agent-causal perspectives, and in many such accounts, Strawson’s notion of what moral responsibility is has had a major influence.  But at the same time, philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists have attempted to cast doubt on whether a notion of moral responsibility as strong as Strawson’s legitimately applies to us, and some have claimed that we should abandon or radically change our everyday practices of holding each other morally responsible.

A focal point of the current discussion is the claim that the reactive attitudes presuppose a robust notion of desert. When one agent is indignant with another, the attitude in some sense presupposes that the agent to whom it is directed deserves, in a robust sense, that indignation.  It remains open whether the desert that is presupposed can be given a contractualist or consequentialist account, or whether it is basic in the sense that the agent deserves the indignation just because she has knowingly committed an immoral action. This special issue of Philosophical Explorations seeks contributions that shed light on the notion of desert implicated in our practice of holding each other morally responsible, and on whether and how such a notion might be retained in the face of the challenges that have sought to dislodge it.